The argument-predicative structure in legal discourse by Mykhailova, O.V.
BicHUK XHY N2 1103 2014 
Y,lU( 81 '372:34 
THEARGUMENT-PREDICATIVE STRUCTURE 
IN LEGAL DISCOURSE 
0. V. Mykhailova, PhD (Kharkiv) 
The article focuses on the analysis of the argument-predicative clause structure in the official type of legal 
discourse with the purpose to establish mental schemes verbalized by the participants of legal communication. The 
application of the cognitive approach allows the explanation of the syntactic peculiarities of legal discourse. 
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MnxaiiJioBa O.B. ApryMeuTuo-npeLJ:nKaTua CTpyKTypa B ropnLJ:nquoMy LJ:HCKypci. B cTarri po3rrr51)l;aiOThC51 
nnTaHH51 noB' 513aui 3 peani3artiero apryMeHTHO-npe)l;HKaTHOI C"IpyKrypn erreMeHTapHoro peqeHH51 B TeKCTax mrroBoro 
ropn)l;nqHoro )l;nceypcy. MeTa cTarri - BCTaHOBnTn MeHTaJihHi cxeMn 3a 51KHMH yqacHnKH npaBoBoi: KOMy.HiKau:ii: 
BIICJIOBJIIOIOTh CBOl HaMipn. 3aCTOCyBaHH51 KOrHiTIIBHOfO ni)l;XO)l;y ):(03BOJI51€ U051CHIITII CIIHTaKCIIqHi OC06JIIIBOCTI 
opraHi3au:ii:ropn11:nqHoro )l;nceypcy. 
KJiroqoBi CJIOBa: a11:'IDHKrn, aKraHTn, apryMeHTHo-npe)l;nKaTHa cTpyKrypa, erreMeHTapHe peqeHH51, MeHTaJihHa 
CXeMa, cipKOHCTaHTII, IOpll)l;nqHIIH)l;IICKy.pC. 
MnxaiiJioBa E.B. ApryMeuTuo-npeLJ:nKaTuaH CTPYKTypa B ropnLJ:nqecKOM LJ:HCKypce. B cTaThe 
paCCMa"IpHBaiOTC51 BOnpOChi, CB513aHHhie C pearrn3au;neif apryMeHTHO-npe)l;HKaTHOH C"IJlYKTYIJhl 3JieMeHTapHOrO 
npe)l;JI02KeHII51 B TeKCTaX ,[(eJIOBOrO Bll)l;a IOpll)l;llqeCKOrO )l;HCKy.pCa. l_(errh CTaThll- ycTaHOBIITh MeHTaJihHhie CXeMhl, 
B COOTBeTCTBIIII C KOTOpbiMII, yqaCTHIIKII npaBOBOH KOMMy.HHKaU:IIII nepe)l;aiOT Onpe)l;eJieHHhie CMhiCJihl. IJpnMeHeHHe 
KOfHIITIIBHOrO UO)l;XO)l;a U03BOJ151eT 06b51CH11Th CIIHTaKcnqecKHe OC06eHHOCTII opraHH3aU:HHIOpll)l;nqeCKOrO )l;IICKy.pCa. 
KJiroqeBhie CJIOBa: a)l;oiOHKrhi, aKraHThi, apryMeHTHo-npe)l;nKaTHa51 c"IpyKrypa, 3rreMeHTapHoe npeM02KeHne, 
MeHTaJihHa51 CXeMa, CllpKOHCTaHThi, IOpll)l;llqeCKIIH )l;IICKy.pC. 
The system of language serves for people's 
communication. The emergence of cognitive science 
gives the possibility to treat linguistic phenomena in 
connection with the realization of the work of the human 
mind. The cognitive approach allows the study of 
linguistic phenomena in their functioning which is based 
on the internal possibilities of the speaker, his or her 
ability to speak and to understand what is said. Cognitive 
linguistics focuses on the representation of human 
knowledge and experience. The way a human being 
perceives the outer world and communicates with it in 
different situations may be analyzed by the application 
of cognitive-discourse paradigm which takes into 
consideration both content and form. 
The actuality of the article consists in the use 
of cognitive-communicative approach to the study of 
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the clause within legal texts as a profession specific 
type of organization ofhuman knowledge. 
The novelty ofthe article arises from the fact 
that cognitive approach is used to analyse mental 
schemes verbalized by clauses in the official type of 
legal texts. 
The aim of the article is to investigate the 
argument-predicative structure of clauses in the official 
type oflegal texts with the purpose to establish their 
mental schemes. 
The object of the article is the argument-
predicative clause structures in legal texts. 
Our analysis of the clause in legal texts is based on 
the ideas of anthropocentrism and functionalism 
dominant in the modern linguistic paradigm 
characterized by explanatory and expansionist 
character typical for cognitive linguistics. 
Functional approach primarily takes into 
consideration the context in which the texts are used. 
The study oflinguistic phenomena within a cognitive 
approach which is a part of functionalism focuses on 
the analysis of concepts existing in human mind, and 
the structured system oflinguistic units by which various 
concepts are realized in human speech and are 
interpreted by the addressee. According to Mustajoki, 
the main principle of functional syntax is "from semantic 
structures to linguistic means" [ 4, p. 21]. 
Among the leading functions of the language we 
can distinguish the communicative and the cognitive 
one. A human is a social being so to transfer the 
knowledge or to impel someone to any action a person 
has to form (construct) the sentence in such way that 
it would be understood by another person or people. In 
its own way the recipient of the information mentally 
can appreciate it and perform the appropriate actions. 
Communication of knowledge and senses, and 
motivation of another person's actions through language 
means is known as verbalization. 
Nowadays the priority in linguistic studies goes to 
cognitive science which helps to characterize the nature 
of the internalized linguistic system enabling humans 
to communicate. The cognitive science traces back to 
the principles of generative grammar which focused 
on the investigation of the mechanisms that generate 
expressions. According to Ray Jackendoff, "the mental 
grammar enables us to put words together into 
sentences" [18, p. 17]. In the work "Patterns in the 
Mind", Jackendoff comes to the conclusion that the 
ability to speak and understand a human language is 
the capacity of the human brain for language learning 
and use. R. Jackendoff considers the phonological and 
the syntactic structures as the mental codes that allow 
the transformation of the thought into motor instructions. 
As an example of such transformations the official type 
oflegal discourse is analyzed in this article. 
In legal sphere ofhuman activities such phenomenon 
as legal discourse occupies the leading place. It is a 
highly specialized use oflanguage for legal purposes. 
Among the main features of legal discourse one can 
distinguish the use oflegal terms: 
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• as independent concepts or arguments of 
various mental schemes, for example: 
(1) I enclose a copy of our standard client care 
letter in duplicate. This sets out our terms and 
conditions. [26, p. 14] 
• in complex syntactic constructions verbalizing 
different mental schemes. For instance, in example (2) 
the first part of which verbalizes the mental scheme 
the influence on the semantic object, and its second 
part - the causation of the action. 
(2) ... we are instructed to commence proceedings 
to recover the debt .... [26, p. 39] 
To analyse the official type of legal discourse 
I follow the viewpoint of I. Shevchenko and 0. 
Morozova who classify discourse as cognitive-
communicative phenomenon [ 1 0]. The analysis oflegal 
discourse focuses on the written type of human 
communication in legal sphere. In accordance with the 
sources oflegal discourse it is divided into three types: 
1) discourse in the court-room, 2) discourse of the law, 
3) the official discourse. The first is realized during 
court hearings such as statements of parties in legal 
proceedings or various applications and complains. The 
second represents the functioning of different laws. 
The third covers legal documentation. In its own way 
the official type may be subdivided into genres. Legal 
correspondence is one of them. R. Haigh classifies 
legal correspondence in accordance with the type of 
document. He distinguishes: letters, faxes, and emails; 
the documentation in commercial sphere, employment 
contracts and instructions; documentation on intellectual 
property, on breach of contract, on negligence claims; 
various memoranda, briefs and instructions; divorce 
and inheritance documentation, etc. [26, p. 3]. 
Among the functions of legal discourse we 
distinguish: informative, influential, evaluative, 
predictive, analytical functions. The informative 
function is based on the analysis of laws and other 
legal acts. The influential function is realized by the 
speeches of a defence lawyer I attorney or a counsel 
for prosecution, or in the written type oflegal discourse 
by such official types oflegal documents as an offer. 
The evaluative function may be analysed in various 
acceptances. The predictive function may be submitted 
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in judicial decisions, judgements, in court statements 
and speeches which can be analysed as a part of oral 
or written (court records) type oflegal discourse. The 
analytical function focuses on the examination oflegal 
documentation only such as various protocols especially 
those composed at the scene. 
From the point of view of the participants oflegal 
discourse we can state that it is a status-oriented type 
of discourse which realizes the communication of 
representatives of various social groups such as lawyer 
vs lawbreaker, attorney I solicitor vs client, the parties 
in a conflict vs a mediator, legal entity vs individual in a 
contract and others. 
Generally speaking, discourse is the macrostructure 
expressing mental and social peculiarities of the 
participants during communication. To analyse legal 
discourse we have to take into consideration: 1) the 
roles of the participants of oral or written or recorded 
type oflegal communication; 2) the information the 
addressee means; 3) the communicative situation which 
focuses on the exchange of thoughts and opinions 
providing the argumentation in courtroom or during the 
contract negotiation etc. 
Analysing legal discourse one can't avoid the 
investigation of cognitive roots and functional 
communicative factors of such legal terms as crime, 
wrongdoing, and tort. The knowledge of legal 
definitions can help a layman and especially a lawyer 
to use them correctly in different types of legal 
discourse. For example, crime is understood as an 
action which is against the law. [25, p. 3 5]. Tort is any 
wrongful act, whether intentional or accidental, where 
injury occurs to another person or party [25, p. 39]. 
Wrongdoing is classified as illegal or immoral behaviour 
[24, p. 2034]. 
Among legal concepts we can distinguish the words 
which are monosemantic, independent from the context 
and emotionally neutral so they may be used in various 
types of discourse. 
(3) We are now to exchange contracts [26, p. 147] 
(4) The court was seen as a neutral or impartial 
third party in all disputes [23, p. 46] 
(5) A person who commits a crime is called a 
criminal [23, p. 58] 
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(6) The law ... comprises a very large and complex 
bodyofrules [23, p. 61] 
Such term as clause may be realized in legal or 
grammatical meaning. It depends on the functional 
communicative factors. In legal discourse it is 
considered as a distinct article or provision in a contract, 
treaty, w.ill, or other formal or legal written document. 
For example, in a tenant's response concerning draft 
lease the matter of negotiation are clauses 4 and 
5 concerning the term oflease and the amount of annual 
rent [26, p. 52]. 
In grammar, clause is considered as the smallest 
grammatical unit that can express a complete 
proposition. Syntactically a clause represents the verb 
along w.ith its subject and their modifiers. If a clause 
provides a complete thought on its own, then it is an 
independent (superordinate) clause; otherwise, it is 
dependent (subordinate) [21]. A typical clause consists 
of a subject and a predicate, where the predicate is 
typically a verb phrase - a verb together w.ith any 
objects and other modifiers. [15] According to 
Y. Testelets, clause is any group of words the head of 
which is the inflective meaningful verb or an auxiliary 
used for the cohesion [7, p. 256]. 
Legal discourse is characterized mostly by complex 
syntactic structures, so we focus our attention on the 
examination of clauses. Clause is considered as the 
argument-predicative structure verbalising a mental 
scheme in a particular sentence. On the other hand 
simple sentence in our interpretation is the argument-
predicative structure representing one proposition and 
realized by the basic model S ----+ NP VP taken into 
consideration semantic functional and communicative 
factors of the surface structure [3, p. 23]. 
The main idea of a clause examination is based on 
the works of Chomsky, Fillmore, J ackendoff, 
Wierzbicka who drew their attention to differences in 
meaning between sentences w.ith the same lexical 
items in syntactically different positions [8; 9; 12-14; 
19;21]. 
Within the cognitive-semantic exploration of 
ontological features of material world subjects and their 
relations such conceptual schemes as frames 
correspond the leading categories ofhuman cognition. 
For instance, Wierzbicka states: the relationship 
between the predicate word, such like DO, SAY, 
WANT, and SEE, and its ' complements ' like 
SOMETHING, ONE THING, or SOMEONE is not 
the same as that between a head and a modifier in an 
attributive relation, if only because a head can normally 
occur with or without its attribute, whereas predicates 
like DO, SAY, WANT, and SEE do require their 
complements (if they are not . . . understood as 
elliptical). At the same time, it is clear that it is the 
element SOMETHING which is dependent on the 
predicates DO, SAY, and WANT, rather than the other 
way around, for it is the predicate which determines 
whether or not a complement is possible, and what the 
range of possible complements is. For example, SEE 
combines, universally, with the complements 
SOMETHING, SOMEONE, and PEOPLE, whereas 
SAY and DO (and in many languages WANT) combine 
only with SOMETHING[16]. 
According to the theory of S. Zhabotynska, the 
basic frames are lexically represented concepts which 
denote the essence of objective reality of a person or 
thing (somebody or something), such as 1) the quantity 
of somebody/something, 2) the quality of somebody/ 
something, 3) the way of existence of somebody/ 
something, 4) the location of somebody/something, 
5) the time of somebody/something's existence [1, 
p.53-62]. 
In legal discourse, the concepts denoting persons 
can be realized by such words as plaintiff, defendant, 
witness, judge, magistrate, lessor, lessee, tenant, 
lawyer, client, solicitor, attoney, etc., for example: 
(7) The district judge made an order in the terms 
of the draft order we had prepared [26, p. 116] 
(8) Our client experienced significant pain in her 
right arm and shoulder following the accident 
[26,p. 124] 
In the official type of legal discourse these legal 
concepts within a clause can realize such syntactic 
valences as: 
• mandatory syntactic argument: 
(9) Our client confirms that ... [26, p. 55] 
(10)please contact our client partner, Ms Felicity 
Matterson. [26, p. 16] 
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• circonstants: 
(11) We look forward to hearing from you or from 
solicitors appointed to act on your behalf 
[26,p.51 ] 
• adjuncts: 
(12) We enclose our client's signed form of 
authorization ... [26, p. 34] 
(13)1 now enclose the draft shareholders' 
agreement. [26, p. 69] 
Considering the word order of example (1 0) the 
peculiarity is in the functional-communicative factor 
which focuses on the mentally reflected identical object: 
our client partner= Ms Felicity Matterson, but within 
an argument-predicative structure their exchange longs 
for in its tum the exchange of circonstant B adjunct 
positions. 
The theory of construction grammar focuses on the 
syntactic patterns such as simple sentences- the unity 
of form and meaning. Such syntactic patterns represent 
the meaning which can be modified (accentuated) by 
lexical units. A. Goldberg explores the idea that 
argument structure constructions provide the basic 
means of clausal expressions in a language [ 1 7, p. 3]. 
She analyses the constructions with ditransitive, 
resultative, and verb-caused motion within cognitive-
semantic paradigm. The basic tenet of construction 
grammar is that traditional constructions-i.e., form-
meaning correspondences - are the basic units of 
language [17, p. 6]. 
To determine the consciousness, the actions, the 
quantity, the quality, the location, and the time features 
of concepts in legal discourse we ground our exploration 
on the semantic approach to predicate classification 
suggesting the syntactic approach based on the 
functioning of the verbs in a sentence. The verbs as 
predicates of the sentence may be divided into static 
and dynamic ones. Static predicates verbalize the 
existence, the quality, and the state; dynamic ones -the 
various types of action, the causation, and the movement. 
The semantic structure corresponds at syntactic 
level to the action----+ subject----+ object relations. Our 
analysis of semantic structures in such genre of the 
official type oflegal discourse as legal correspondence 
shows that: 
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The semantic subject in the official type of legal 
discourse may be verbalized by the proper name 
(mostly in the preamble of a legal document), or by the 
personal pronoun (mostly I or we). 
(14)I enclose a copy of a letter ... [26, p. 53] 
The semantic object in the official type of legal 
discourse may be verbalized by different parts of 
speech representing various semantic valences, for 
example: 
(15) We reserve the right to bill at two monthly 
intervals [26, p. 17] 
The right realizes the semantic role of a patient. 
Among the dynamic predicates in the official type 
of legal discourse we distinguish: enclose, oblige, 
provide, note, praise, indicate, discuss, contact. The 
peculiarity of the official type oflegal discourse is that 
the cognitive focus of these predicates falls not on the 
semantic subject performing the semantic role of the 
agent (the action doer). They focus on the syntactic 
object or complement corresponding to the rheme of 
the clause. 
(16) We now enclose a dra{t order [26, p. 53] 
(17) I will contact vou again [26, p. 90] 
The predicates denoting mental or perceptive 
activities such as: accept, confirm, approve, oblige, 
discover; focus on the semantic role - the recipient 
(the participant of the communicative situation whose 
interests are infringed or positively affected). 
(18) We accept the amended plan [26, p. 56] 
(19) We confirm receipt of your letter dated 
3 February 20- [26, p. 126] 
Among the static predicates we distinguish: be, 
regard, contain. 
(20)Mr Miller is an innocent infringer [26, p. 93] 
(21) Clause contains restrictions on ... [26, p. 69] 
Such predicates focus on the semantic object 
verbalizing the semantic role - the patient (the 
participant of the communicative situation who is 
involved in action and/or expresses its material 
existence). 
Cognitive approach to the exploration of a clause 
as a pattern which unites deep and surface structures 
allows the explanation oflinguistic phenomena in terms 
of schemes or prototypes. According toR. Langacker, 
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"scheme is the abstract categorization that is fully 
compatible with all members of the category it defines 
this is an integrated structure that embodies the 
commonality of its members, which are conceptions 
of greater specificity and detail that elaborate the 
schema in contrasting ways" [20, p. 3 71]. He describes 
the scheme as the entity with peculiar structure. 
Schema is the generalization, discrete form oflinguistic 
structures and meanings. 
Any clause can be treated both from the point of 
view oflanguage and speech: as a language pattern 
it is constructed according to a mental scheme 
existing in human mind; as a speech unit it verbalizes 
particular meanings [3, p. 61; 11, p. 320-322]. To 
analyse the clause in legal discourse we focus our 
attention on its semantic structure which comprises 
relative and predicative structures. The nucleus of 
the relative structure is the action which comprises 
different arguments realizing semantic roles. The 
argument-predicative structure focuses on the 
predicate including mandatory agents and facultative 
circonstants. Argument-predicative structure is the 
semantic nucleus of a sentence [3, p. 64]. The 
proposition of a sentence realizes its sense. The centre 
of any proposition is its predicate which indicates the 
number and the type of the arguments and relations 
between them [5; 8; 9]. 
The sense of a sentence is transformed in 
accordance with mental schemes which are 
verbalized in syntactic structures and according to 
appropriate knowledge about some situation [3, p. 53]. 
Mental schemes of a simple sentence are the 
generalized representations of typical propositions 
fixed by structural schemes of the simple sentence 
[3, p. 57, 59, 94]. The proposition within the cognitive 
approach is a special operative structure of cognition 
and I or a particular unit ofknowledge organization in 
a human mind which represents the world [2, p. 137-
140]. The proposition which is represented by a 
particular structure scheme of a simple sentence is 
determined as its sense ("categorical-semantic 
concept") [6, p. 80] 
Among the dominant mental schemes in the official 
type oflegal discourse we distinguish the following: 
• Mental scheme of location [Somebody I 
Something is Somewhere] verbalizes the existence 
of Somebody I Something in space, for example: 
(22) The registered office is at 16 Anderton 
Crescent, Felixstowe [26, p. 70] 
• Mental scheme of possession [Somebody I 
Something possesses Something] verbalizes both the 
semantic subject and object, for example: 
(23) Clause 2 contains a list of matters 
(24)Mr Griffiths had a grievance [26, p. 79] 
(25)Mr Miller owns ten different combinations of 
"-institute.com" ... [26, p. 93] 
Within the mental scheme of existence [How 
Somebody I Something is] we distinguish: 
• Mental scheme of qualification 
(26) Both you and Mr Shorter are directors of the 
company[26,p. 70] 
• Mental scheme of characterization: 
(27)A cyber-squatter is someone who deliberately 
registers domain names similar or identical to 
the trademark of another party with the 
intention of .. [26, p. 93] 
To sum up we should stress that the main 
peculiarities of the official type oflegal discourse are 
as follows: 
• the concept client forms the nucleus oflegal 
correspondence, because each matter for discussion 
focus around his/her (individual) or its (legal entity) 
interests; 
• the concept client is verbalized in argument-
predicative structure transforming the sense (deep 
structure of the sentence) through the such syntactic 
frames as: mental schemes of characterization, 
possession, location. 
The further analysis should focus on the 
investigation of cognitive-communicative peculiarities 
of other types oflegal discourse. 
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